ized in it in a quite peculiar manner. . . . Whether we consider nutrition, voluntary and instinctive behaviour, development, the harmonious functioning of the organism under normal conditions, or its regulative functioning in cases of disturbances of the normal, we find that practically all vital processes are so organized that they are directed to the maintenance, production or restoration of the wholeness of the organism. On that account the physico-chemical description of the vital processes does not exhaust them [i. e., is not exhaustive]. They must also be considered from the standpoint of their significance for the maintenance of the organism. And we see that in fact—in spite of the postulate that science must only proceed physico-chemically—biology has at all times applied organismic ideas, and must apply them, and that whole spheres of investigation are concerned with the establishment of the significance of the organs and of organic processes for the whole. . . , This point of view cannot be avoided so long as we cannot exclude the notion of an organ as " serving " some definite purpose. Similarly, the concept of " function " has an organismic sense; it only has significance within an organism to the maintenance of which the function is exerted. . . . Indeed it might be said that the real biological problem lies just in this question of the significance of organs and vital processes for the organism.'

Bertalanffy decisively rejects both the machine theory and vitalism. He admits that Driesch has proved the untenability of the machine theory, but

asserts that Driesch is driven to assume his entelechy only because he has overlooked the possibilities of explanation offered by organicism. * Vitalism/ he asserts, [c] means nothing less than a renunciation of a scientific explanation of